A socio-economic evaluation of the SOx-charge in Japan by Matsuno, Yu & Ueta, Kazuhiro
TitleA socio-economic evaluation of the SOx-charge in Japan
Author(s)Matsuno, Yu; Ueta, Kazuhiro







WORKING PAPER NO. 43
a
A Socio-Economic Evaluation 
of the S Ox-charge in Japan* 
           By 
Yu Matsuno* * and Kazuhiro Ueta* *





of the S Ox-charge in Japan*
          By 
Yu Matsuno* * and Kazuhiro Ueta*
**Faculty of Business, Meiji University 
***Graduate School of Economics,Kyoto University
       mail correspondence to K. Ueta 
Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University 
  Yoshida-Honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-01 
               Japan 
           Tel:+81-75-753-3439 
            Fax:+81-75-753-3492 
        E-Mail : ueta @ econ. kyoto-u. ac. j p
*This paper appears in one Chapter of the book, Andersen, M. and R. U. Sprenger (eds. )
(1999), Market-based instruments in environmental mana eg ment, Edward Elgar. 
This is a revised and translated version of the paper entitled 'Kokenhou-fukakin 
(Compensation Law load levy)' which is Chapter 4 of the book, Ueta, K., T. Oka and H. 
Niizawa (eds.) (1997), Economics of Environmental Policy, Nihon-Hyoron, pp. 79-96. 
(in Japanese)
1. The pollution load levy and pollution reduction incentives 
Pollution control policy for the reduction of sulfur oxides(SOx) emissions from stationary 
sources in Japan has been cited as a case of successful environmental po icy worthy of 
international scrutiny (Weidner [1995]). A foundational component of this policy.is the 
Compensation Law for Pollution-Related Health Damage, which was passed in September 
1973 in order to provide redress for pollution victims, coming into effect in September of the 
following year. The Compensation Law imposed asystem of pollution load levies (referred to 
hereafter simply as the CL levy) on stationary sources, and, although the system was not 
originally established asan economic ncentive system to reduce missions, this structure was 
akin to a system of emission charges in the sense that "taxes" were assessed on polluters. 
However, whether or not this system of levies provided an incentive effect leading to the actual 
reduction of pollution is the subject of debate. 
     Some investigators maintain that he CL levy system did not confer a pollution reduction 
effect. Horiuchi ([1995], pp.39-40), for example, shows that he average cost of SOx 
reduction at three thermal power plants exceeded the CL levy rate (fiscal 1979), suggesting that 
the installation ofdesulfurization equipment was due not to the Compensation Law but instead 
to direct controls. Tsukatani ([1983], p.20) also finds that he increase in production costs 
attributable to the CL levy was so small as to be hidden by price fluctuations, concluding that 
the levy had little inductive power, and that its pollution reduction effect was negligible. 
     Others assert that he CL levy did in fact deliver an incentive effect for pollution 
reduction. Imura ([1988], pp.1 15-8) compares the reduction rates of SOx emission between 
Compensation Law designated areas and other (non-designated) areas from the year that 
regulatory standards for total pollution load control were enforced (1978), finding that 
reduction rates were greater in those areas with relatively higher levy. rates, and suggesting that 
differences inlevy rates were a major factor. Weizsaker ([1994], p.126) holds that direct 
controls were rendered meaningless bythe CL levy, stating that, "Japan also has emission 
standards for power stations, which, however, were rendered meaningless bythe S02 charge.
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It simply would not have occurred to a power station operator to exhaust the potential allowed 
by the standards, because of the expense. " 
     The question arises, then, as to how such radically different evaluations can be 
produced. In fact, the aforementioned studies all contain methodological shortcomings that 
cannot be overlooked. The Horiuchi approach considers only desulfurization stack-scrubbers 
from among the various options for SOx reduction, while the greater portion of Tsukatani's 
"increase inproduction costs attributable to the CL levy" has no direct relation to the reduction 
of SOx emissions. A more appropriate comparison would be marginal batement cost of SOx 
emissions versus the level of levy rates. Meanwhile, ven if we ignore changes in industrial 
structure, Imura's comparison f SOx reduction rates from the year that regulatory standards 
for total pollution load control were enforced cannot be viewed as complete without empirical, 
quantitative consideration f the effects temming from administrative guidance on the part of 
the national nd various local governments and individually negotiated pollution control 
agreements. Furthermore, the study (Jesinghaus [1980]) which serves as the basis for 
Weizsaker's analysis neither appropriately compares levy amounts against SOx abatement costs 
nor recognizes the existence ofpollution control agreements. 
     Given these sorts of limitations, it is difficult if not impossible to use existing research 
to definitively judge whether or not the CL levy provided areal incentive towards pollution 
reduction. Here, we will clarify the structure ofthe CL levy system from the standpoint of
economics, and present empirical consideration f the effectiveness of the system in reducing 
pollution.
2. The framework of Japan's SOx reduction efforts 
Since the early 1970s, SOx emissions have decreased nationwide. Reasons for this trend 
include the implementation of direct controls such as total pollutant load controls, higher prices 
for petroleum products caused by the two oil crises, and the CL levy (here we consider whether
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the CL levy actually deserves to be included in this list), which have resulted in a shift in 
Japan's industrial structure towards less energy-intensive, cleaner industries, the installation of 
desulfurization stack scrubbers, and the use of low-sulfur fuels." Accordingly, even in those 
areas of Japan most severely affected by air pollution, SOx concentration levels fell to within 
prescribed environmental quality standard(see Figure 1).
(insert here Figure 1)
j
     Because it is generally held that the primary factor esponsible for the accomplishment 
of these reductions was direct controls, let us first consider the basis for this view. 
(1) National government-imposed l gislative regulations 
The 1962 Law Concerning Controls on the Emission of Smoke and Soot stipulated 
concentration standards for smokestack outlet emissions, but, because human health is affected 
by air pollution levels near the ground, K-value controls were implemented from 1968. The 
calculation of K-values is performed as follows: 
                               q = K x 10-3xHe2, 
where q[Nm3/h] represents olerable limits of pollution per hour among facilities generating 
smoke and dust, and He[m] is effective chimney height. For each area, K-values were 
decided as part of overall policy, and amounts of SOx emissions were regulated for each 
individual stack. Gradually tightened revisions of K-values were carried out seven times 
through 1976. However, because it was difficult to meet environmental quality standards in 
concentrated industrial zones using K-values alone, total pollutant load controls were 
introduced in 1974 (although not completely enforced until 1978). By means of these 
regulations, the national government specified esignated areas, with prefectural governments
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Figure 1 SOx emission, Levy Rates and Disbursements
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responsible for drawing up plans in order to meet environmental standards, giving 
consideration to local conditions, and establishing the following "a" and "b" values: 
                               Q=a x Wb, 
where Q is the tolerable amount of SOx emissions [Nm3/h], W is the amount of fuel used 
converted to heavy oil equivalent [kl/h], and 0.8 : b < 1. 
     Unlike K-values, which are calculated for individual stacks, regulatory standards for 
total pollutant load control are applied to entire plants, and are actuated for relatively large-scale 
installations (as defined by comparison of W values) that generate roughly 80% or more of total 
SOx emissions in a designated area. For smaller and medium-scale facilities, fuel usage 
regulations are employed which mandate the use of low-sulfur fuel. Further, for newly 
established emissions-generating i stallations, a stricter Q figure than in the foregoing formula 
is implemented. Despite being known as "total" pollutant load controls, however, permitted 
emissions are actually defined in terms of hourly flows, meaning that emissions foregone in 
one period or season cannot be "made up" in another. A total of 24 areas were officially 
designated from 1974 to 1976, with controls enforced in all of them by May 1978. 
(2) local government-enacted or inances and pollution control agreements 
Local governments inJapan have generally preceded the national government in adopting 
pollution countermeasures. Local governments have often adopted more stringent emissions 
standards than the national government, leading the way by imposing their own total pollutant 
load controls. Additionally, local governments have negotiated pollution control agreements 
with large-scale facilities, and, even though these agreements are not legally compulsory and 
specify tighter limits than legislated standards, enterprises that have accepted such agreements 
have subsequently abided by them. Administrative guidance is also thought o have been 
useful in achieving SOx emissions reductions. 
(3) Other Factors
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Subsidies for the purchase of pollution control equipment were also made available, but these 
did not make a noticeable direct contribution to the reduction of SOx emissions. On the other 
hand, nationally administrated energy conservation policies and energy source diversification 
(i.e., away from oil) following the two oil crises, while not specifically designed to promote 
SOx reduction, are thought o have made a real contribution. And, through such legislation as 
the Industry Relocation Promotion Law, it is possible that contributions to SOx emissions 
reduction have been brought about in severely affected areas (for example, those areas 
designated by the Compensation Law for Pollution-Related Health Damage) by the consequent 
dispersion of polluting facilities to comparatively more rural sites.
3. The basic structure of the CL levy system 
Apart from the above-mentioned control measures, and independent of the Air Pollution 
Control Law and other similar legislation, the Compensation Law imposed a levy on SOx 
emissions, naturally leading to assertions that it provided an incentive ffect with regard to SOx 
reduction. Here, let us briefly consider the structure of the CL levy system. 
(1) Overview of the CL framework 
First, let us refer to the overall framework established by the Compensation Law as the CL 
framework. In addition, since all new certification of air pollution health victims was halted in 
1988, the present research focuses primarily on the period prior to this extensive legislative 
revision." 
     The structure of the CL framework is illustrated in Figure 2; air pollution problems are 
relevant o Class 1 areas." The CL framework essentially provided for the collection of levies 
from SOx-emitting installations (accounting for 80% of CL-related isbursements) and a certain 
supplementary amount from motor vehicle taxes (furnishing the remaining 20% of 
disbursements), utilizing this pool of funds to compensate certified sufferers. In designating 
certified sufferers, the CL specified regions ("designated areas") where frequent occurrences of
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illness resulting from significant air pollution had occurred. When a person exposed to air 
pollution in the home or workplace beyond a specified period of time ("minimum exposure 
requirements") contracted chronic bronchitis, bronchial asthma, asthmatic bronchitis, 
pulmonary emphysema, or their sequelae ("designated diseases"), a causal relationship between 
such diseases and air pollution was systematically established. Compensation amounts were 
decided in advance, and the levies were collected in order to provide the funds necessitated by 
compensation payments. Here, we present the case of the levy system with regard to 
pollutants from stationary sources. Such levies were imposed on those facilities releasing 
maximum gas emissions over a certain threshold, and the number of installations from which 
levies were collected numbered between 8,000 and 9,000 annually.
(insert here Figure 2)
(2) Method of setting the levy rate 
(a) Basic Structure 
The levy rate is defined as amount of levy paid versus unit SOx emissions (yen/Nm3). The 
conceptual formula for setting the levy rate is: 
     levy rate = 
           anticipated compensation disbursements in t fiscal year / 
                amount of nationwide SOx emissions in (t- 1) calendar year 
During (t- 1) fiscal year, the Environment Agency projects anticipated isbursements in t fiscal 
year from past data, has major SOx emitters report their emissions records for the (t- 1) calendar 
year, estimates total emissions accordingly, and set the levy rate by the end of (t- 1) fiscal year. 
     The foremost feature of this framework is that the express purpose of the levy is to 


















































































































































































































































































































decided first, followed by the levy rate. Next, SOx emitters do not know at the actual time of 
emission exactly what the rate will be. Third, levies are not imposed on emissions of nitrogen 
oxides(NOx) and other presumably health-deteriorative pollutants. Finally, because the health 
damage identified by the CL framework is stipulated to be cumulative and irreversible, even 
though health damage in t fiscal year is partly the result of emissions in (t-2) year and earlier, 
the entire burden of compensation disbursements i  imposed on emitters in (t- 1) year. 
     Viewed in light of the polluter pays principle, the third and fourth factors cited above 
place an unfair burden on current emitters of SOx. And, at the same time, the amount of 
compensation (i.e., levies) may well be virtually unresponsive to even major decreases in SOx 
emissions. This is accentuated bythe fact that compensation isdriven by total requests made 
by applicants, which, as the program becomes better known over time, is likely to expand. In 
other words, the amount of stipulated compensation is both independent of current SOx 
emissions, and, as suggested by the above-noted first feature of the framework, tends to induce 
expansion of the levy rate (see Figure 1).4' 
      The converse, however, is that excessive burdens placed on current emitters of SOx 
may serve as a deterrent to current SOx emissions. In general, if the amount of compensation 
for damage is averaged over polluting emissions, the levy rate becomes lower than the marginal 
damage cost caused by such emissions (the rate of a Pigouvian tax), thereby inviting a greater-
than-optimal level of pollution (Hamada [1977], pp. 93-101).But in case the damage is 
cumulative and irreversible and the pollution in the past was serious, where total compensation 
is covered by a levy on current emissions, the levy rate could exceed the Pigouvian tax rate. 
The fact that at almost 100per cent of observation points Sox concentration fell below the 
national ambient standard by 1980, 93.8% in 1978FY, 98.9% in 1981FY, suggests that this is 
the case for the CL levy. That is, the resulting anti-pollution incentive would function even 
more strongly than a Pigouvian tax (see Figure 3). The foregoing line of reasoning is pursued 
from the standpoint of a Pigouvian tax which takes into account only the damage ffected by 
current emissions in the current period of analysis, but even if a Pigouvian tax oriented toward
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future damage is considered, in the case of large past emissions, it is possible for the levy rate 
of a damage compensation system imposed only on current pollutant emissions to be higher 
than the Pigouvian tax.
(insert here Figure 3)
(b) Regional differences among levy rates 
According to the principle that "liability for compensation" i corporated into regulatory 
reasoning (i.e., according toa report by the Central Environmental Pollution Control Council), 
it was contended that enterprises located in areas designated ashaving a high incidence of
pollution-related health damage should pay at least half of total costs. Levy rates in designated 
areas were consequently averaged and set at nine times the rate in non-designated areas. 
However, because r duction rates of SOx emissions indesignated areas were actually higher 
than in other areas, and because the "nine times" figure was not adjusted, the share of the total 
burden borne by enterprises in designated areas fell below 50% from fiscal 1979. When the 
law was subsequently revised, the share paid by enterprises in designated areas fell to about 
one third. 
     Differences inlevy rates were established not only between designated and non-
designated areas, but among designated areas as well. This was because, following 
implementation of the regulatory framework, sharp differentials appeared among designated 
areas in terms of the ratio between SOx emission levels and compensation amounts, and 
differing rates were required in order to rectify inter-area inequities. 
     As can be seen from the foregoing, levy rates were basically decided according to the 
need for funds, with adjustments made to allocate the burden between stationary and mobile 
sources of emissions and among various areas. It is theoretically possible for levy rates to be
-10-















et : amount of Sox emissions during period t 
Dt : monetary amount of damage inflicted during period t 
FDt : monetary amount of damage inflicted during period t, caused by SOx emissions in the past and 
 current/past other pollutions emissions, that is FDt=Dt (et=O). The value is exogenous to Figure3 
MAC : marginal abatement cost of SOx emissions 
eo : efficient amount of Sox emissions 
Co : Pigouvian tax rate 
Ci : damage compensation levy rate in effect for damage inflicted during period t, that is Dt-FDt 
 additionally caused by et. 
C2: damage compensation levy rate in effect for Dt
    Pigouvian tax rate Co attains efficient amount of SOx emissions eo. When the damage iscaused only by 
   current SOx emissions, if the amount of compensation fordamage isaveraged over current SOx emissions, 
   the damage compensation levy rate Ci becomes lower than Co which entails more amount of SOx emissions 
   ei than eo. But if the damage isnot caused only by current SOx emissions but also SOx emissions in the past 
   and current/past other pollutant emissions, and if damage compensation levy was imposed only on current 
   SOx emissions, the levy rate for emission level eo, C2, can become higher than Co. In Figure 3, FDt is 
   assumed very large and Dt/et curve doesn't intersect and always comes over MAC curve. This means that he 
   levy system always lacks in revenue to meet what is needed for compensation at any level of the levy rate. 
   But the Japanese CL levy system actually imposes levy not on et but on et-1, which can't be changed uring t
   period, so it cannot happen theoretically aside from the problem of disbursements projection and it hasn't 
   happened empirically. Nontheless the shape of Dt/et curve suggests hat if SOx emissions are reduced for any 
   reason, the CL levy rate inevitably becomes higher. 
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higher than the corresponding Pigouvian tax, but whether or not the implemented levy rates 
provided an anti-pollution incentive to enterprises is an question that requires independent 
empirical analysis in order to resolve.
4. The pollution reduction effect of the CL levy 
In determining if the CL levy system did in fact create an incentive ffect, it is necessary to 
compare levy rates and marginal abatement costs of SOx emissions. Cost schedules according 
to each SOx reduction- method are required in order to do so, but this kind of data is extremely 
difficult to obtain. Thus, as a practical measure, we have limited our consideration to thermal 
power plants in Osaka Prefecture, one of the most densely populated areas of Japan. 
(1) A case atudy of thermal power plants in Osaka prefecture 
(a) Reasoning supporting case selection 
Viewed by industry, electric power generation is the largest producer of SOx, accounting for 
over 30% of emissions. Even within designated areas, where the steel industry is the leading 
emitter, electric power ranks second with about 20% of emissions. Thus, consideration of 
reductions in SOx emissions achieved by the electric power industry provides a reasonable 
picture of the overall situation. Also, given the nature of the participating enterprises as public 
utilities, and specifically because the Osaka Prefectural Government and Kansai Electric Power 
Corp. (the regional electric utility) have concluded a pollution control agreement, required data 
on estimated costs is more readily available than for other industries and areas, thereby allowing 
more detailed analysis. 
(b) The Relationship between Pollution Control Agreements and Total Pollutant Load Controls 
The pollution control agreement between Osaka Prefecture and Kansai Electric Power was 
concluded in May 1974, and it originally specified annual SOx, annual NOx, and daily SOx 
emissions limitations, as well as sulfur content of fuel, amount of fuel used, and the utilization 
rate of generating plants. The thermal efficiency of the power plants did not change to a 
significant degree, but, because the agreement did take efficiency into account, limitations on
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fuel use and plant utilization rates served as a proxy from the standpoint of emissions. 
Additionally, since maximum permitted SOx emission is the product of maximum permitted 
fuel use and maximum permitted sulfur content, the specified emissions targets are 
automatically achieved so long as fuel use and sulfur content limits are carefully adhered to. 
The agreement was modified in March 1980, eliminating fuel use (and, practically speaking, 
utilization rate) limits for plants equipped with denitration stack scrubbers. However, other 
control values specified by the agreement, even at their weakest in fiscal 1975 (the first year of 
implementation), were stricter than subsequently adopted total pollutant load controls, and were 
actually tightened over time. 
(c) The SOx Emissions Reduction Record at Thermal Plants in Osaka Prefecture 
Kansai Electric Power consistently adhered to the agreement, and has since reduced its SOx 
emissions. Such reductions are generally considered to be achieved at thermal power plants 
by reducing the amount of electricity generated, improving thermal efficiency (i.e., energy 
savings), using low-sulfur content fuel, and/or installing desulfurization stack scrubbers. 
Total power generated by Kansai Electric increased over the period of consideration, but most 
of the increase can be attributed to nuclear power plants. Although nuclear plants raise issues 
apart from air pollution, it cannot be denied that their use holds down increases in SOx 
emissions. However, the decision to move towards nuclear power generation is preferentially 
influenced by energy policy independent of strategies for air pollution reduction. For the 
purposes of simplification, therefore, SOx reduction measures are considered by taking the 
volume of electricity generated at each thermal plant as givens' The period of analysis is for 
the years after 1975, for which data is available. 
     Of the above-noted SOx-cutting methods, energy savings at individual existing plants 
(improvement of thermal efficiency) is technically difficult, leaving low sulfur-content fuel and 
desulfurization stack scrubbers as realistic options. Let us then weigh the respective costs of 
SOx reduction for these two methods. Figure 4 shows the relationship between SOx 
emissions and cost (converted to cost per kl of heavy oil) faced in fiscal 1975 by the area's
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largest hermal generating plant, Sakaikou Power Station.6) It can readily be seen that SOx 
reductions bring about increased costs, and, as a profit-motivated nterprise, Kansai Electric 
could be expected to implement the least expensive method of reaching targeted emissions 
levels. According to Figure 4, if desulfurization stack scrubbers are not installed, C heavy oil 
only can be used for a level of SOx between 10.8 and 18.9 [Nm3/kl], a mixture of C heavy oil 
and crude oil for between 0.63 and 10.08 [Nm3/kl], and a mixture of LNG and crude oil for 
between 0 and 0.63 [Nm3/kl]. When the option of desulfurization stack scrubbers is 
considered, C heavy oil alone (without scrubbers) can be used to achieve missions of between 
12.6 and 18.9 [Nm3/kl], C heavy oil with partial installation of scrubbers for 1.89 to 12.6 
[Nm3/kl], and low-sulfur fuel with full installation of scrubbers for 0.63 to 1.89 [Nm3/kl]. 
The pollution control agreement called for sulfur (S) content of 0.16wt% (1.0 [Nm3/kl]), and 
an annual average level of 0.15wt% (0.95 [Nm3/kl], or total annual SOx emissions of 5,440t) 
was in fact achieved.') From the figure, it can be seen that a combination of crude oil, heavy 
oil, and volatile oil (such as naptha nd natural gas liquids -- not LNG) in the ratio of 97:3: 0 
(heat generation comparison) would be the least cost alternative, and this is roughly matched by 
the actual ratio of 77: 17: 7 (rounded) that was adopted. Desulfurization stack scrubbers 
would have been a viable choice given these levels of emissions, but it appears the decision had 
already been taken at this point to convert o LNG, thus obviating the future need for scrubbers. 
     Constructing amarginal abatement cost curve according to Figure 4, we arrive at Figure 
5; the level of SOx emissions determined by the CL levy rate (the following year's rate versus 
relevant emissions) was 15 [Nm3/kl], as opposed to the achievement of actual emissions of 
0.95 [Nm3/kl] between r2 and r4 in Figure 5, showing that the CL levy played no role at all in 
the reduction of SOx emissions.') Accordingly, the reductions must be attributed to the 
pollution control agreement. Given certain periods of full plant utilization, the maximum daily 
emissions level (ten day average) set by the agreement is more stringent than the annual evel, 
and the achieved level of 21.1 [t/day] (or 0.63 [Nm3/kl]) was under the agreement level of 
22.6 [t/day] (or 0.67 [Nm3/kl]).
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(insert here Figure 4, Figure 5)
     CL levy rates subsequently rose, but the analysis for the same (Sakaikou) installation 
yields the same result in 1980, with Figure 6 illustrating the relationship between the amount of 
SOx emissions and costs. As can be gleaned from the figure, the price of virtually non-sulfur 
LNG is below that of other fuels.') The use of LNG alone allows cost minimization, and also 
leads to minimization of SOx emissions (this state of affairs has continued up to the present). 
In this case, neither total pollutant load controls nor the pollution control agreement have any 
bearing on the reduction of SOx emissions. In fact, however, a mix of about 70% LNG with 
the remainder made up of crude and heavy oil was used; because of the nature of long-term 
LNG contracts, there are limits on the amount that can be used. Without such limits, similar 
curves could be constructed for other plants, all of which would be using 100% LNG. But 
this is not the case, as dictated by energy source diversification policy and difficulties in 
locating LNG storage facilities.
(insert here Figure 6)
     Hence, let us examine the, case of oil-fired thermal plants which are both located in the 
same designated area and which do not use LNG. None of the three such plants found use 
crude oil, which contains relatively little sulfur and is comparatively inexpensive. Instead all 
three exclusively rely on heavy oil, meaning that the marginal abatement costs of SOx 
emissions are high and that the CL levy should not have had any effect as of 1980.
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Figure 4 SOx Emissions and Costs at Sakaikou 
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Figure 6 SOx Emissions and Costs at Sakaikou 
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Conditions changed in 1983, however, such that price differentials hrank among heavy oils 
with differing sulfur content. Figure 7 represents he marginal abatement cost curve forr one of 
these plants, known as the Sanpou Generating Station. The annual average sulfur content of 
fuel was specified in the pollution control agreement as 0.2wt% (1.3 [Nm3/kl]), while a level of 
0.12wt% (0.76 [Nm3/kl], or SOx emissions of 1.10t/year) was actually achieved between r, and 
1 in Figure 7. There is a possibility, then, that the CL levy did provide a reduction incentive 
effect, although one reason for this is that the plant is small-scale (only 8% of the generating 
capacity of Sakakou) and is subject o looser standards with regard to the pollution control 
agreement and total pollutant load controls.
(insert here Figure 7)
     Meanwhile, a plant located in a more rural part of the prefecture where regulatory 
standards on total pollutant load control are loose, control agreement values are strict, and, 
because the area is non-designated for Compensation Law purposes, where the CL levy rate is 
low, there is no indication that the CL levy provided any pollution reduction effect. In the end, 
consideration of individual power generating plants suggests that SOx reductions at thermal 
plants in Osaka Prefecture were essentially due to the pollution control agreement and to relative 
declines in the price of LNG. Basically, the CL levy was not responsible for a significant 
pollution reduction effect, although there is a possibility that the levy did come into play due to 
the narrowing of price gaps among fuels with differing sulfur content, in a case where both 
total pollutant load control and the effected pollution control agreement had weak influence 
because the scale of the plant in question was small. 
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Assuming the same features resulting from the formula deciding CL levy rates as noted in part 
(2) of section 3, and given that large-scale producers reduced their SOx emissions, there is a 
possibility that the CL levy did generate a pollution reduction incentive among small and 
medium enterprises located in the same areas as large-scale mitters, and therefore subject o the 
same levy rates, but facing relatively less stringent direct controls. 
     Before concluding, then, let us consider a case in the-vicinity of Osaka City. The 
minimum scale for application of regulatory standards for total pollutant load control in this area 
is defined as a rated fuel consumption of 0.8 [kl/h] (or about 2% of that of the Sanpo Power 
Station), equivalent to an approximate gas emissions level of 9,400 [Nm3/h]. This level is 
well above the 5,000 [Nm3/h] maximum gas emissions threshold for required payment of the 
CL levy, and is therefore within the range of consideration of the CL levy rate incentive ffect. 
Minimum scale for application of the regulatory standards for total pollutant load control is 1.65 
[Nm3/h] (or 2.06 [Nm3/kl]) for Osaka City and Sakai City, and 2.48 [Nm3/h] (or 3.1 [Nm3/kl]) 
for other municipalities in the prefecture. Desulfurization stack scrubbers are comparatively 
expensive for operations on this scale, and the main anti-SOx measure consists of fuel choice 
(C heavy oil, A heavy oil, or kerosene). Constructing aSOx abatement cost curve as with 
large-scale power plants (see Figure 8), it appears that the levy did not play a role in 1975, but 
that a SOx emissions reduction incentive was manifested in 1980 as a result of narrowed price 
gaps among fuels with differing sulfur content and of higher levy rates. The situation appears 
to be the same after 1980 as well.
(insert here Figure 8)
5. Conclusion
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For electric power generating plants in Osaka Prefecture, the main factor inducing reductions in 
SOx emissions was not the CL levy but direct controls, especially those controls stemming 
from the pollution control agreement concluded with the regional electric utility. However, the 
anti-pollution incentive ffect of the CL levy cannot be completely ignored, as it does appear to 
have come into play in a limited sense. The effect is found to strengthen over time vis a vis 
small and medium scale power plants and manufacturing enterprises which are subject o 
relatively weaker direct controls, under conditions where there are ongoing narrow price gaps 
among differing sulfur content fuels and rising levy rates. 
     CL designated areas in Osaka Prefecture feature the highest levy rates in Japan, but, 
because direct controls such as total pollutant load controls and pollution control agreements are 
also quite strict, there is not much scope for the operation of CL levy-induced pollution 
reduction incentives. However, even in areas where levy rates are somewhat low, but where 
direct controls are also relatively weak, an anti-pollution effect rather greater than that seen in 
the Osaka region may be expected.
Notes 
1) Other causative factors in SOx reduction include government assistance programs for 
pollution prevention investment such as policy-tied financing, special depreciation, accelerated 
depreciation, but, in the case of the steel industry for example, the effect of subsidy policies is 
deemed to have been slight. See Matsuno [ 1997a,b]. 
2) Here we consider only the functions of the CL levy system. An outline of the 
establishment of and influences on the system will be made the subject of a future paper, but 
refer to Matsuno [ 1996]. 
3) The Compensation Law stipulates Class 1 (air pollution) and Class 2 (water pollution) areas. 
Here, we limit discussion to the levy system for the former. Fore more on the composition of 
the system, see Kido [ 1975].
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4) A straightforward comparison of similar sorts of systems in other countries is complicated 
by differing purposes behind the systems and differing country conditions. For reference, 
however, if tax (or similar instrument) rates on SOx emissions and sulfur content in fuel are 
comparatively aligned with CL levy rates (unitized as [Y/SO2-kg]), Sweden has a sulfur tax rate 
of 339 (1991), Norway has a sulfur tax rate of 299 (1988), France has an air pollutant 
emissions urcharge rate of 3-4 (1985-90), and the US has an average S02 emissions permit 
price of 17(1994), 12(1995). Meanwhile, Japan has rates of 741-1877 (for designated areas, 
as of 1987) and 110 (for non-designated areas, 1987); levy rates in CL-designated areas can be 
seen to be quite high compared to charges in other countries. Figures for Sweden, Norway 
and France are from Ishi [1993]; for the US, from The New York Times March 23, 1996, 
p.35; and for Japan from the Environment Agency [1994]. Yen exchange rate conversion is 
according to arbitrated and standard rates of exchange in The Bank of Japan [1996] Economic 
Statistics Annual 1995 Edition. 
5) There is of course the issue of the allotment of power generation among power stations, but 
we assume this issue was decided upon without particular regard for anti-SOx measures, given 
thermal efficiency of each power station and the prices of fuel consumed there. 
6) Here, cost is the sum of the cost of fuel and the cost of desulfurization (when desulfurization 
stack scrubbers are installed). Cost in cases where low-sulfur fuel is used is represented for 
various fuel types (according to sulfur content) converted to price per kl of heavy oil. With 
regard to reductions in emissions of SOx by means of desulfurization, cost was calculated 
based on the sequential introduction of desulfurization stack scrubbers at the eight generation 
units of Sakaikou Power Station, together with changeover to low-sulfur fuel. It was thereby 
found that the least-cost method of reaching specified emissions targets was as follows. 
Desulfurization stack scrubbers were needed when Sox emissions of under 12.6[Nm3/kl] were 
required. Desulfurization stack scrubbers are introduced for each unit seaquentially, equipped 
units using 3wt% C heavy oil and non-equipped units using 2wt% C heavy oil. After all units 
had been fitted with scrubbers, lower-sulfur than 3wt% C heavy oil fuel is introduced for 
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equipped scrubbers. This was found to be the most cost-effective procedure. In Figure 4 
(number of units with desulfurization stack scrubbers, heavy oil conversion sulfur content of 
fuel, fuel used for equipped unit) from the right, (4/8 units, 3wt%, C heavy oil), (8/8units, 
3wt%, C heavy oil), (8/8units, 2wt%, C heavy oil), and (8/8units, lwt%, combination of C 
heavy oil and crude oil) are represented by the four X points. 
7) As the power plant utilization rate (i.e., the amount of fuel used) is fixed, annual SOx 
emissions and average S content are synonymous. 
8) When a line joins the points representing the least-cost means of achieving the values for 
SOx emissions in Figure 4, absolute values for the slopes of the line segments i the vertical 
axis SOx marginal abatement cost shown in Figure 5. However, within the dotted line labeled 
"With Desulfurization Stack Scrubbers" in Figure 5, the section from 1.89-12.6 [Nm3/kl] is not 
realized continuously, and only seven points (making the eight segments) can be established. 
Although emitters can't tell the following year's rate, as the rate is higher than that of previous 
year, conclution which reject he effectiveness of the levy is reinforced. 
9) This sudden fall of LNG price is mainly due to the introduction of Indonesian LNG in 1977 
based on the long-term contract between KEP and a Indonesian public corporation and it 
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